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Independent Orbiter Assessment
Assessment of the Nose Wheel Steering FMEA/CIL
m
u
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected
in June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA)
of the Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical
Items List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and
GFE Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206,
_nst_ions for Preparation of FMEA and CIL. October I0, 1986.
The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Nose Wheel
Steering (NWS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and
potential critical items. To preserve independence, this
analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results
contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA
results were then compared to the proposed NASA post 51-L
FMEA/CIL baseline. A resolution of each discrepancy from the
comparison is provided through additional analysis as required.
This report documents the results of that comparison for the
Orbiter NWS hardware.
The IOA product for the NWS analysis consisted of 78 failure
mode "worksheets" that resulted in 42 potential critical items
being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline (as
of 01 January 1988) which consisted of 34 CIL items. The
comparison determined if there were any results which had been
found by the IOA but were not in the NASA baseline. This
comparison produced agreement on only 21 FMEAs Which caused
differences in 13 CIL items. Reference Figure 1.
Some issues arose due to differences between the NASA and IOA
FMEA/CIL preparation instructions and the analysis assumptions.
NASA had used an older ground rules document which has been
superseded by the N$TS 22206 used by the IOA. After comparison,
there were 14 discrepancies found that were not already
identified by NASA, and the remaining issues may be attributed
to differences in ground rules.
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m2.0 INTRODUCTION
2.1 Purpose
The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS Office
has undertaken the task of reevaluating the FMEA/CIL for the
Space Shuttle design. MDAC is providing an independent
assessment of the Orbiter FMEA/CIL reevaluation results for
completeness and technical accuracy.
w
u
w
_=
u
w
2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL
Assessment Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem
analysis addresses hardware, functions, internal and external
interfaces, and operational requirements for all mission
phases.
2.3 Analysis Approach
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis
utilizing as-built drawings to divide the respective subsystem
into components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware
item is evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality.
These data are documented in the respective subsystem analysis
report, and are used to assess the proposed post 51-L NASA and
Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL. The IOA analysis approach is
summarized in the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0
summarizes the assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor
FMEA/CIL which is documented in this report.
Step 1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
Subsystem familiarization
Define subsystem functions
Define subsystem components
Define subsystem specific ground rules
and assumptions
Step 2.0
2.1
2.2
2.3
Define subsystem analysis diagram
Define subsystem
Define major assemblies
Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0
3.1
3.2
Failure events definition
Construct matrix of failure modes
Document IOA analysis results
Step 4.0
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
Resolve differences
Review in-house
Document assessment issues
Forward findings to Project Manager
2.4 Ground Rules and Assumptions
The ground rules and assumptions used in the IOA are presented
in Appendix B. The subsystem specific ground rules were
defined to limit the analysis to single-failed-parts for each
failure mode. A subset of the failure mode keywords were
identified for the NWS team. This allowed for commonality in
the analysis results.
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3.0 SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION
3.1 Design and Function
The NWS hardware provides the primary directional control for the
Orbiter during landing rollout. Deflection of the commander's
or pilot's rudder pedals transmits an electrical steering signal
to the NWS Control Box. These electrical signals meter hydraulic
power through the NWS actuator which physically displaces the
actuator piston. The actuator piston, which is mechanically
linked to the nose wheel collar, can turn the nose wheel as much
as +/- i0 degrees for directional control during rollout.
m
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3.2 NWS Modes
The NWS subsystem has three different operational modes.
modes of operation are:
These 3
i) General Purpose Computer (GPC) mode,
2) Direct (Manual) mode, and
3) Free Castor (Differential Braking) mode.
The GPC mode of NWS is now the primary directional control mode
for the Orbiter during landing rollout. In this mode, the GPC
processes the steering signals before sending them to the Steering
Control Box (SCB). The GPC mode also employs a triple channel
wraparound feedback system that compares the actual nose wheel
position with the commanded position. This added capability
enabled NWS to be elevated over differential braking as the
primary mode of directional control during landing rollout.
In the Direct mode of NWS, steering signals bypass the GPCs and
go directly to the SCB by way of the command transducer (xducer).
The free castor mode is a passive mode of NWS where the nose wheel
rotates freely and steering is accomplished by differential
braking and use of the rudder. During free castor, nose wheel
shimmy (oscillations) are prevented by the NWS actuator's internal
hydraulic damping capability.
3.3 NWS Timeline
The steering timeline is important to the NWS analysis because some
failure modes have different effects and criticalities depending on
the time of failure. The GPC mode of NWS is selected during the
final approach phase of landing. Between main gear touchdown
(MGTD) and nose gear touchdown (NGTD), all directional control is
performed by the rudder. Following NGTD, NWS becomes active and
operates in tandem with the rudder. As the Orbiter decelerates
during landing rollout, the rudder effectiveness decreases leaving
NWS and differential braking as the only available means of
directional control for the vehicle.
5
3.4 NWS Effectiveness
Steering the Orbiter with the nose wheel takes advantage of an
effective moment arm about 5 times as long as that available
when using differential braking. The turning capability of
the vehicle using only differential braking is not adequate to
maintain directional control of the Orbiter for a landing
scenario with blown tires. This inadequacy has contributed to
the recent upgrades to the NWS system.
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3.5 NWS Upgrades
A 3 phase upgrade was initiated in an attempt to make the NWS
system fail operational/fail safe. The Phase I upgrade consisted
of rewiring the GPC and Direct positions of the NWS switch,
disconnecting the GPC contact, and adding a 2.5 inch extension to
the switch toggle. This upgrade inhibited the GPC mode and made
the activation of the Direct mode, which must be activated after
NGTD, a task requiring less concentration.
The Phase II upgrade was implemented and flown on STS-61A, STS-
61C, and STS-51L. It primarily consisted of reconnecting the
GPC switch contact and adding a wraparound feedback (FB) system
for the GPC mode that included software logic for Redundancy
Management (RM) and failure detection. Parabolic signal shaping
was also added to the command xducer steering signal used by the
Direct mode of NWS. This is the current state of the NWS system
and the design considered for the IOA analysis.
The Phase III upgrade is presently in the early design stage.
Unless the NWS Phase III redesign eliminates all the remaining
single point failures, the NWS system is at best fail safe.
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3.6 NWS Component Description
The following sections highlight the major components of NWS:
(Reference Figure 2)
. The Steering Control Box (SCB) has a single electrical power
source - Main Bus A. At NGTD the GPC issues enable signals
that allow the SCB to ground this power source which then
activates the pilot valve solenoids in the steering actuator
assembly. The SCB also monitors the nose wheel steering
signal current for comparison with the feedback transducer
signal. The SCB contains separate failure detection circuits
that monitor 5 potential NWS failures:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
command T ransd-ucer Br0keh Linkage
Command Transducer Open/Short
Rate/Direction Error
Electro-hydraulic Valve Open/Short
Feedback Transducer Open/Short
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Any 1 failure detection will automatically downmode NWS to
the free castor mode and annunciate the NWS fail light.
(Reference Figure 3)
The Rudder Pedal Assemblies consist of the commander/pilot
rudder pedals and linkages, 2 rudder pedal transducer
assemblies, 1 command transducer and 4 brake pedal
position transducers• The commander and pilot rudder
pedals are mechanically linked to one another and to their
transducers. Rudder pedal NWS signals are proportional
to the translational deflection of the rudder pedals
while braking signals are proportional to the rotational
deflection of the rudder pedals. * (Reference Figure 4)
The NWS Actuator Assembly converts electrical steering
signals into a physical displacement of the actuator arm
which is mechanically linked to the nose wheel. Hydraulic
system No. 1 supplies 3000 psi fluid to the NWS actuator•
The fluid is filtered before it reaches the shutoff valve.
The actuator has 2 pilot valves. Pilot valve No. 1 opens
or closes the shutoff valve• Pilot valve No. 2 opens or
closes the bypass valves. Both pilot valves must be open to
activate NWS; if either valve closes, the system downmodes
to the free castor mode. Once the hydraulic pressure in the
actuator reaches 1350 psi, a pressure sensitive switch
closes which inhibits the hardwired electrical path to the
NWS fail light; however, if the system pressure ever falls
below i000 psi, the pressure switch will open and the NWS
fail light will be annunciated.
Once the system is energized, the electro-hydraulic (E-H)
servo valve meters high pressure flow to the piston balance
area proportional to the steering signal transmitted by the
SCB. The high pressure in the balance area moves the actuator
piston/arm back and forth. The motion of the piston, which
is attached to the nose gear strut, rotates the torque link
and turns the nose wheel.
The actuator's feedback xducer provides "steering velocity"
data to the SCB which is monitored by one of the SCB failure
detection circuits. In addition, the GPC mode employs a
triply redundant feedback transducer system to provide NW
position data to the GPC failure detection logic in the NW
Subsystem Operating Program (SOP).
System protection against high pressure is provided by 2
overload check valves and a return line check valve. The
hydraulic fluid andsystem pressure required for shimmy
damping during free castor is provided by the accumulator
through the anti-cavitation check valves• (Reference
Figure 5)
* Rudder commands are processed independently of NWS commands.
. The Failure Annunciator System illuminates a NWS fail light
which warns the crew that a detectable failure has occurred
or that the NWS system may be unreliable. Control Bus ABI
provides power to a Type III hybrid circuit driver which
signals the annunciator control assembly to illuminate the
NWS fail light. The fail signal may originate in either the
hardwired path from the actuator pressure switch or in the NW
Position SOP through MDM FF4. In the GPC mode of NWS, the
hardwired path is inhibited until NGTD. (Reference Figure 6)
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The Activation System was included to maintain a more
complete NWS analysis. Main Bus A is the single power source
for the NWS system. A circuit breaker provides protection
against high voltage/current spikes. The NWS toggle switch
must be in the GPC or Direct position to power the system.
The ROLL/YAW CSS/AUTO PBIs configure a flight control channel
that determines whether the steering signals will originate
at the rudder pedals or in autoland guidance. The activation
system also has a current limit resistor in line with the fail
light power source CNTL BUS ABI and 3 isolation resistors
providing circuit protection for MDMs that monitor the power
lines. (Reference Figure 7)
The Data Processing System (DPS) Flight Critical Forward MDMs
were originally included in this analysis because of the
strong dependence NWS has on the health of this interfacing
subsystem. IOA later decided that determining the effects of
failure modes in interfacing subsystems was beyond the scope
of the NWS analysis. For this reason, IOA has deleted the
MDM analysis from this assessment. The MDM evaluation can be
found in the IOA DPS analysis.
Above Items 4 and 5 interface with the Electrical Power and
Distribution Control (EPD&C) system. This document contains only
a partial analysis of these interfacing components. The analysis
examines only the NWS related effects of these component failure
modes.
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3.7 interfaces and Locations
Most of the major NWS components are located in 1 of 2 locations
on the Orbiter. The Activation System, the Failure Annunciation
System, and the Rudder Pedal Assemblies are located on the Flight
Deck. The NWS Control Box and Actuator Assembly are both attached
to the nose gear strut. The GPCs and the Flight Forward MDMs are
all located in Avionics Bays i, 2, and 3. (Reference Figure 8)
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3.8 Hierarchy
Figure 2 illustrates the hierarchy of the NWS hardware.
through 7 comprise the detailed system representations.
Figures 3
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Figure 3 - NWS STEERING CONTROL BOX
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Figure 5 - NWS STEERING ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY
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Figure 6 - NWS FAILURE ANNUNCIATION SYSTEM
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Figure 8 - NWS FUNCTIONAL INTERFACES AND LOCATIONS
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4.0 ASSESSMENT RESULTS
The IOA analysis of the NWS hardware initially generated 78 failure
mode worksheets and identified 42 Potential Critical Items (PCIs).
As a result of the assessment process, 15 NWS failure mode
worksheets were deleted and an additional 5 analysis worksheets were
generated and added to the assessment package. The assessment
comparison also gave rise to 14 issues between the IOA NWS analysis
and the corresponding NASA FMEAs.
Of these issues, 9 are the result of failure modes generated by the
IOA that did not have corresponding NASA FMEAs. The remainder of
the issues are the result of differences in the NWS subsystem
failure mode assigned hardware/functional criticalities.
Some of the criticality issues cannot be resolved without
performing additional analysis or testing of the NWS system. Other
issues can be more easily resolved by establishing official flight
rules or crew procedures for certain failure modes. In either
case, IOA has recommended upgrading the existing criticalities of
the affected NWS components until conclusive test/analysis results
or written flight rules/crew procedures are available to support
downgrading the criticalities.
Table I presents a summary of firm FMEA assessment issues that
exist for each NWS component.
TABLE I Summary of IOA FMEA Assessment Issues
Component
Rudder Pedal
Assembly
NWS Control Box
NWS Actuator
Assembly
NWS/EPD&C:
Failure Annun-
ciator System
Activation
System
NASA
27
IOA
7
6
33
5
15
5
17
IOA Issues
2
9
3
TOTAL 58 68 14
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The IOA assessment of the existing CILs gave rise to 9 issues. Of
these issues, 8 are the result of IOA identifying additional
Potential Critical Items. One PCI concerns the generation of
independent FMEA/CILs for like critical hardware as recommended by
NSTS 22206. A second PCI is the result of an IOA recommended
criticality upgrade. The remainder of the 8 PCIs concern hardware
or failure modes excluded by the NASA analysis. IOA also recommends
the deletion of one NASA CIL.
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Table I_ presents a summary of firm CIL assessment issues that
exist for each component.
TABLE II Summary of IOA CIL Assessment Issues
Component NASA IOA IOA Issues
Rudder Pedal
Assembly
NWS Control Box
NWS Actuator
Assembly
NWS/EPD&C:
Failure Annun-
ciator System
Activation
System
5
4
2O
5
5
5
25
u
6
1
7
1
TOTAL 34 41 9
imm
Appendix C presents the detailed assessment worksheets for each
failure mode identified and assessed. Appendix D highlights the
NASA Critical Items and corresponding IOA worksheet ID. Appendix
E contains the IOA analysis worksheets that were used to assess
the NASA FMEA/CIL. Appendix F provides a cross reference between
the NASA FMEA and corresponding IOA worksheet.
Table III presents a summary Of the IOA failure criticalities for
the Post 51-L FMEA baseline. Further discussion of each of these
subdivisions and the applicable failure modes is provided in
subsequent paragraphs.
u
TABLE III Summary of IOA Failure Modes and Criticalities
Criticality: 2/2 3/IR 3/2R 3/3 TOTAL
Rudder Pedal
Assembly
NWS Control Box
NWS Actuator
Assembly
NWS/EPD&C:
Failure Annun-
ciator System
Activation
System
w
i/I 2/IR
3 2
- 4
5 17
1 4
9 27
2
1
6
I
7
1
5
5
5
7
6
33
w
TOTAL - 16 - 16 68
5
17
17
Of the failure modes analyzed, 41 were determined to be critical
items. A summary of the IOA critical items is presented in
Table IV. I
TABLE IV Summary of IOA Critical Items
Criticality: i/I 2/IR 2/2 3/IR 3/2R TOTAL
Rudder Pedal
Assembly
NWS Control Box
NWS Actuator
Assembly
NWS/EPD&C:
Failure Annun-
ciator System
Activation
System
3
m
i
2
4
17
5
5
25
m
61 4 - 1 -
TOTAL 9 27 - 5 - 41
n
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The scheme for assigning IOA assessment (Appendix C) and analysis
(Appendix E) worksheet numbers is shown in Table V.
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TABLE V: IOA Worksheet Numbers
Component IOA ID Number
RUDDER PEDAL ASSEMBLIES (RPA)
NWS CONTROL BOX (SCB)
NWS ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY
NWS FAILURE ANNUNCIATION SYSTEM
NWS ACTIVATION SYSTEM
NWS-101 to NWS-108
NWS-201 to NWS-206
NWS-301 to NWS-337
NWS-401 to NWS-405
NWS-501 to NWS-510,
NWS-001 to NWS-005
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4.1 Assessment Results: RUDDER PEDAL ASSEMBLY
The Rudder Pedal Assembly (RPA) analysis performed by IOA
examined failure modes for the rudder pedals, the Rudder Pedal
Transducer Assemblies (RPTAs), and the command transducer. The
RPA is a linkage system whose transducer measured deflections
control the rudder and the brakes as well as NWS. The IOA NWS
analysis included component failure modes covered by NASA FMEAs
from the NWS, the Landing Deceleration, and the Guidance
Navigation and Control subsystems. During the assessment
comparison process, IOA matched the NWS worksheets to the
appropriate subsystem FMEAs but limited the assessment discussion
to the failure effects on the Orbiter vehicle's directional
control during landing rollout.
IOA generated 8 failure worksheets for the RPA - 2 on the rudder
pedal linkage, 2 on the command transducer and 4 on the Rudder
Pedal Transducer Assemblies (RPTAs). NASA originally wrote 6
FMEAs for the RPA, generating only 2 failure modes for the RPTAs.
During their reevaluation, NASA generated an additional FMEA for
the RPTAs. This new failure mode, the 'physical jamming' of the
RPTA transducer drive or an RPTA 'linkage failure' (FMEA # 05-1-
FC-3442-3), was mapped to the following IOA failure modes:
i)
2)
Loss of RPTA output, and
Erroneous output of the RPTA
w
w
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4.2 Assessment Results: STEERING CONTROL BOX
Detailed schematics of the Steering Control Box (SCB) are
considered proprietary information by the manufacturer and were
not available for the IOA analysis. As a result, the IOA
analysis treated the SCB as a black box. The NASA FMEAs took
into consideration the failure of 2 of the SCB functions:
i) SCB Failure Detection (FMEA # 02-1-089-1, '2), and
2) SCB Signal Output (FMEA # 02-1-088-1,-2)
The IOA analysis considered the failure of three functions of the
SCB:
I) SCB Failure Detection,
2) SCB Steering Control Signal Output, and
3) SCB Pilot Solenoid Activation Signal
The IOA analysis analyzed the failure detection function of
the SCB, but treated separately the functions of the two SCB
output signals. This produced two more IOA worksheets than
the corresponding FMEAs. IOA recommended the writing of 2
additional FMEAs to cover these failure modes because the
failure of either SCB output signal is a possible critical
item.
19
4.3 Assessment Results: STEERING ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY
The Steering Actuator Assembly, which contains both electronic
and hydraulic hardware, has the largest number of components in
the NWS subsystem. The IOA generated 37 analysis worksheets for
16 components in the NWS Actuator Assembly. The comparison
between the IOA analysis and the NASA FMEAs resulted in a number
of issues that are discussed in the following sections.
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4.3.1 NWS Actuator: SHIMMY DAMPING
The issue that affects more of the NWS actuator component
criticalities concerns the loss of the nose wheel hydraulic
shimmy damping capability. IOA believes that the worst case
effect of the loss of the NWS hydraulic shimmy damping is not
reflected by the original NASA FMEA criticalities or their
effects descriptions. The NASA reevaluation process has
brought into consideration the possible worst case effects of
the loss of the shimmy damping; however, these new FMEAs are
still in review. As a result, IOA has decided not to remove
the following discussion presenting its concerns on the shimmy
damping issue.
The effects descriptions of the original affected NASA FMEAs
reference the co-rotating nose wheels as a stabilizing factor
that prevents nose wheel shimmy. IOA believes the presently
available test data is not adequate to decisively determine
whether the co-rotating nose wheels actually can, without the
aid of active hydraulic damping, successfully prevent nose wheel
shimmy under all normal loading conditions during landing
rollout. IOA is unaware of any shimmy damping tests of the
Orbiter nose wheel performed when NWS was in an unpowered state
and the actuator hydraulic damping was inactive. Because nose
wheel shimmy can lead to nose gear structural damage and the
possible loss of the crew/vehicle, IOA assigned all the
corresponding NWS actuator components higher criticalities than
the original NASA FMEAs.
IOA is concerned about two different failure states of the NWS
actuator when the Orbiter is in a free castor mode. The first
is a failure resulting in the total loss of the shimmy damping
capability of the NWS actuator. The second is a failure that
results in a degraded state of shimmy damping in the actuator.
A total loss of shimmy damping can occur in two ways:
i) a total loss of the hydraulic fluid from the
portion of the actuator that is isolated for
shimmy damping during free castor, or
2) a loss of the linkage connecting the NWS
actuator to the nose gear strut.
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A degraded state of shimmy damping can be the result of cavitation
or a partial loss of hydraulic fluid from the isolated portion of
the NWS actuator during free castor.
IOA recommended an upgrade in the assigned criticalities for the
components affected by the shimmy damping issue until the worst
case effects of the loss of shimmy damping are determined. Toward
this end, IOA recommends that NASA analyze the operation of the NWS
system without hydraulic damping. This might be done using already
existing analytical models of the NWS system. If these studies
warrant, NASA could then perform dynamic tests of the NWS system
without the hydraulic damping. Afterwards, the actuator component
criticalities could be adjusted to reflect the results of the
analysis/testing.
The FMEAs that are possibly affected by this issue are listed
below:
FMEA # Item Failure Mode MDAC ID
w
w
w
02-1-094-2 Accumulator Open 301
02-1-090-1 Hydraulic Housing Leakage/Rupture 307
02-I-084-1 Actuator/Piston Broken Linkage 309
None Rigid Line/Connectors Leakage 312
02-1-091-2 Anticav Chk Valve Closed 323
02-1-101-2 EH Prot Chk Valve Open 326
02-1-100-2 Bypass Valve Premature Relief 334
4.3.2 NW8 Actuator: PILOT VALVE8 AND SHUTOFF VALVE
There are 2 issues concerning the actuator pilot valves. The
first deals with the separation of FMEAs and the second with
an inconsistency in criticality assignment between the pilot
valves and the shutoff valve. These issues are discussed in
the following 2 sections.
w
4.3.2a Pilot Valves: SEPARATE FMEA/CILs
IOA recommends writing separate FMEAs on the 2 actuator pilot
valves for the following reasons:
i. The Pilot Valve #i functions to activate/deactivate the
actuator shutoff valve; the Pilot Valve #2 functions to
activate/deactivate the actuator bypass/relief valves.
NSTS 22206 section 2.3.1f states the following:
"Identical components used for different functions
shall be treated separately in the FMEA."
w
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2. The failing closed of either of the pilot valves results
in the loss of NWS (Criticality IR/2). A separate FMEA/
CIL is required for each critical item/failure mode. m
4.3.2b Pilot Valve #1 / Shutoff Valve:
CRITICALITY
INCONSISTENCY OF
The Pilot Valve #I is activated in order to open the actuator
shutoff valve. If the pilot valve fails open, the shutoff valve
will open and the actuator will be prematurely subjected to
hydraulic pressure. This result is identical to the effect of
failing the shutoff valve open. The NASA FMEAs, however, assign
different criticalities to these 2 failure modes:
Criticality
FMEA # item Failure Func/Hdw
02-01-096-2 Shutoff Valve Open
02-01-095-2 Pilot Valve Open
IR/ 3
3/3
The IOA analysis assigned criticalities of 3/3 to both of these
failure modes. The IOA analysis did not determine that the
premature subjection of the actuator to hydraulic pressure was
in any way life or vehicle threatening. IOA recommends the
downgrading of the shutoff criticality to 3/3 unless this failure
is shown to be life/vehicle threatening. In either case, IOA is
of the opinion that these 2 failure item/modes should be assigned
identical criticalities.
4.3.3 NWS Actuator: E-H PROTECTION CHECK VALVE
The Electro-Hydraulic protection check valve allows hydraulic
fluid exiting the NWS actuator piston balance area to return to
Hydraulic System 1 while preventing any flow of hydraulic fluid
in the reverse direction. If the E-H check valve fails open,
the first stage of the E-H servo valve will be subject to back
pressure from the hydraulic return line. A pressure spike in
the return line at this time will subject the sensitive first
stage filament to damage that could result in the possible loss
of the NWS system.
ordinarily, there is no reason to expect any high pressure in the
return line; however, IOA discovered that nose gear retraction
or deploy may actually produce a high pressure spike in this
line. Because the ramifications of this failure scenario were
not available to IOA during this assessment, IOA recommends that
NASA determine the worst case affects of this failure on both
the active modes of NWS and the shimmy damping capability of the
Orbiter in the free castor mode. The criticality can then be
updated accordingly. The affected FMEA is listed below:
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FMEA # Item Failure Mode
02-01-101-2 E-H Protection Check Valve Open
m
u
u
4.3.4 NWS Actuator: ANTI-CAVITATION CHECK VALVES
The anti-cavitation check valves are free floating ball valves
that function to prevent" cavitation in the NWS actuator during
free castor of the nose wheel. During normal operation of NWS,
high pressure hydraulic fluid closes the valves anti-cavitation
check valves preventing the fluid from entering the return line
prematurely.
if the check valves fail open, there will be a resulting
degradation in NWS response that will lead to the possible
downmoding of NWS to free castor. If the valves fail closed,
there is no effect on NWS because closed is the normal position
of the valves during NWS operation.
The NASA FMEA effects section for the check valves failing closed
(FMEA #02-ID-091-I), states the following:
(B) LOSS OF NOSE WHEEL STEERING (LOSS OF TORQUE)
The FMEA assigns a criticality of 1/1 to this failure mode.
IOA does not concur with the FMEA effects and recommends that
this failure mode criticality be downgraded to 2/IR (based on
degraded shimmy damping during free castor) unless the FMEA
effects are proven accurate.
m
4.3.5 NWS Actuator: OVERLOAD CHECK VALVES
The overload check valves are free floating ball valves that
relieve excessive pressure buildup on the operational side
(actuator piston side) of the actuator assembly. Each of the two
valves protects a separate hydraulic line. The valves failing
closed will have no immediate effect on NWS or the Orbiter.
However, considering a worst case landing scenario where the nose
wheel hits a rut or rock, a pressure spike will surge unrelieved
into the NWS actuator. This will cause possible damage to the
sensitive first stage of the E-H valve resulting in the loss of
NWS. The affected FMEA is listed below:
FMEA # ITEM FAILURE
02-1-106-1 Overload Check Valve (2) Closed
IOA recommends upgrading this failure criticality to 2/IR
unless it can be shown conclusively that this failure mode is
not credible.
n
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4.3.6 NWS Actuator: MISSING ITEMS / FAILURE MODES
The IOA analysis of the NWS hydraulic actuator produced
analysis worksheets on items and failure modes that had no
corresponding NASA FMEAs. The following sections describe
these items and their failure modes.
4.3.6a NWS Actuatorz PISTON
! !;_ z_ _ _ _ _ : _ _ _ : : _ : _.... _ 7 _ _
The NWS actuator piston is the actual turning mechanism for
the NWS system. One end of the piston is contained inside the
NWS actuator balance area while the other end is mechanically
linked to the nose wheel steering column. Hydraulic pressure
in the actuator piston balance area moves the piston back and
forth. This translational motion of the piston linkage
rotates the nose gear steering column which turns the nose
wheel.
The IOA analysis failed the actuator piston in a "jammed"
mode. There is no corresponding NASA FMEA for this failure
mode. The manufacturer of the NWS actuator stated that the
probability of the actuator piston jamming is very small;
however, IOA still recommends the generation of a FMEA/CIL
for this item/failure mode for the following reasons:
I. The linkage portion of the piston is exposed
to external debris/contamination after nose
gear deploy and throughout landing rollout.
2. A jammed piston will result in the possible
loss of crew/vehicle (Criticality i/i).
3. NSTS 22206 section 2.3.1a states the following: _v_ :_
"An FMEA shall be prepared on all hardware...
regardless of the probability of occurrence
for each failure mode."
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4.3.6b NWS Actuator- EXTERNAL RIGID LINE
The NWS actuator has an external rigid line connecting the
retraction side of the actuator piston to the actuator main
housing. IOA believes this to be a hydraulic line and that
a leak in this line would result in the loss of NWS and the
possible loss of all the hydraulic shimmy damping capability
of the NWS system.
mm
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There are no NASA FMEAs written for this rigid line.
Section 2.3.1a states the following:
NSTS 22206
"NOTE: The following shall not be considered as
'structure'; therefore, an FMEA is required.
I. Pressure vessels, ... fluid lines, rigid pipes ...
Rigid lines and ducts shall be analyzed separately
for each different fluid."
IOA recommends that FMEA/CILs be generated for this item and its
failure modes.
4.3.6c NWS Aotuator: INLET FILTER
The hydraulic fluid that enters the NWS actuator passes through
an inlet filter before it reaches the actuator shutoff valve.
The NWS system could be lost as a result of this filter becoming
blocked or failing to filter contaminants from the hydraulic
fluid. During testing, this filter exceeded its specified
operational limit which resulted in unacceptable sluggish
response from the NWS system. IOA recommends that FMEA/CILs be
generated for this item and its failure modes.
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4.4 Assessment Results: NWS/EPD&C FAILURE ANNUNCIATION SYSTEM
The NWS EPD&C Failure Annunciation Subsytem is composed of the
NWS fail light, an annunciator control assembly, and a type III
hybrid driver. An issue that affected the criticality of more
than one component failure mode concerns the effect of a
premature annunciation of the NWS fail light. Because IOA is
not aware of any crew procedures written that define a required
crew response to the annunciation of the NWS fail light and
informal discussions with crew members showed an inclination to
manually shut off NWS in response to the illumination of the
fail light, IOA assigned criticalities based on the following
groundrule:
"Any annunciation of the NWS fail light will result in
the manual downmoding of NWS to the free castor mode
leaving differential braking as the only means for
steering the vehicle during landing rollout."
This groundrule resulted in minimum criticalities of 2/IR for all
failure modes resulting in the annunciation of the NWS fail light.
This result produced differences between IOA and FMEA assigned
criticalities for failure modes resulting in the illumination of
the NWS fail light without an actual failure of the NWS operating
system.
25
The FMEAs affected by this issue are listed below: m
FMEA # Item Failure Mode m
02-01-093-2
05-03-12376-TBD
05-6BC-2200-2
Pressure Switch
Annunciator Control Assy.
Forward Load Cntl Assy.
Open
Premature Output
Premature Output
IOA originally recommended upgrading the criticalities of these
items until such time that crew procedures were signed off that
would support downgrading the criticalities. IOA has been
assured that the crew will be trained NOT to manually downmode
the NWS system in respons@ _Q the annunciation of the NWS fail
light. Based upon this assertion, IOA does not consider this a
firm issue; however, NSTS 22206 does require that official craw
procedures be defined to support the downgrading of any component
criticalities.
4.5 Assessment Results: NWS/EPD&C ACTIVATION SYSTEM
The IOA analysis of the NWS/EPD&C Activation System included
FMEAs covered by both the EPD&C subsystem and the GNC subsystem.
The analysis included the NWS toggle switch, the CSS/AUTO PBIs,
a circuit breaker, and some resistors.
The IOA analysis of the ROLL/YAW CSS and AUTO Push Button
Indicators (PBIs) gave rise to a number of issues. The PBIs,
their function, and the associated issues are discussed in the
following paragraphs.
Because the ROLL/YAW CSS and AUTO PBIs are the only PBIs that
affect the NWS System, they were the only PBIs considered in the
NWS analysis.* These PBIs configure the Orbiter flight control
channel to either manual (CSS) control or Auto Guidance
(AUTO/AUTOLAND) control.
The flight control channel is normally configured to AUTO during
the early phase of entry but has always been reconfigured to CSS
for approach and landing. An autolanding has never been
performed by the Orbiter. If an autolanding were to be attempted,
Microwave Landing System (MLS) navigation must be available at
the landing site because the typical Tactical Air Command and
Navigation System (TACAN) navigation position errors are too
large to land the Orbiter safely. An MLS is presently only
required for night landings and 4 out of the last 7 flights
landed without an MLS.
* A complete analysis of the PBIs is located in the IOA GN&C
analysis deliverables.
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The NASA FMEAs failed these PBIs in 2 modes:
i) Internal Short
2) Fails to Transfer
The IOA recommends failing the PBIs in 3 modes:
i) Internal Shorts
2) Failure to Transfer
3) Stuck Depressed/Jammed
The NASA FMEAs assign criticalities of 3/3 to all the PBI failure
modes. IOA believes the loss of all the redundant capability to
configure/reconfigure flight control of the Orbiter can be life/
vehicle threatening and recommend criticalities of 3/IR for all
these failure modes.
In addition, IOA believes the failure of the ROLL/YAW AUTO PBI
in a stuck depressed mode should be assigned a criticality of
I/i based on the following reasons:
I) There are 2 ways to reconfigure flight control from
AUTO to CSS:
a) Pressing 1 of the CSS PBIs
b) Moving the RHC out of _etent (greater than 6 ° )
However, a stuck AUTO PBI will automatically
reconfigure flight control software to AUTO as soon
as the CSS PBI is released or the RHC returns to
neutral.
2) The Orbiter cannot land safely in AUTO mode without
as MLS and there is no guarantee that an MLS will be
available except fornight landings.
3) The Orbiter cannot land with the RHC continuously
out of detent.
4) The crew can continuously hold a CSS PBI depressed
and land successfully. However, this is not an
official crew procedure and only official crew
procedures may be used to downgrade an item
criticality.
This issue was brought before the Shuttle Avionics Software
Control Board in the form of a possible software fix
(CR #89356A). However, the decision was delayed until the
possible effects of this failure mode on all similar DAP switches
are determined.
27
4.6 Ground Speed Enable: SRB AND ET SEPARATION SWITCHES
The NWS system cannot be activated before the SCB receives the
ground speed enable command that originates in the Landing SOP.
This enable command is sent as a result of the Landing SOP
receiving a Weight on Wheels (WOW) signal, a Weight on Nose Gear
(WONG) signal, and a signal confirming that the angle of attack
of the Orbiter vehicle is less than 0 degrees.
The WOW and WONG signals originate in the landing gear proximity
sensor boxes; however, these signals can be superseded by the
crew. This is accomplished by actuating the ET separation or the
SRB separation switch. The actuation of either switch will
generate an initiate discrete satisfying both the WOW and the
WONG requirements necessary for the Landing SOP to send the
ground speed enable command. (Note that the Orbiter angle of
attack signal is still required).
IOA is concerned that the FMEAs generated for the SRB and ET
separation switches do not mention this aspect of the switches'
function and its effect on the NWS system. IOA recommends that
the affected FMEAs (FMEA #05-6-2235 through FMEA #05-6-2239) be
updated accordingly.
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APPENDIX A
ACRONYMS
AOA
ATO
AUTO
BFS
BITE
CHNL
CIL
CMD
CNTL
CRIT
CSS
DDU
DPS
EH
ERR
ENA
- Abort Once Around
- Abort To Orbit
- Autoland Guidance Computer Configuration
- Backup Flight System
- Built-In Test Equipment
- Channel
- Critical Items List
- Command, Commander
- Control
- Criticality
- Control Stick Steering
- Display Driver Unit
- Data Processing System
- Electro-Hydraulic
- Error
- Enable
EPD&C - Electrical Power Distribution and Control
ET - External Tank
F - Functional
FB - Feedback
FF - Flight Forward
FM - Failure Mode
FMEA - Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
GNC - Guidance Navigation and Control
GPC - General Purpose Computer
HDW - Hardware
HW - Hardware
HYD - Hydraulic
IOA - Independent Orbiter Assessment
LRU - Line Replaceable Unit
MAN - Manual (Direct Mode of NWS)
MDAC - McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
MDM - Multiplexer/Demultiplexer
MGTD - Main Gear Touchdown
MM - Major Mode
MSBLS - Microwave Scanning Beam Landing System
NA - Not Applicable
NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NGTD - Nose Gear Touchdown
NSTS - National Space Transportation System
NW - Nose Wheel
NWS - Nose Wheel Steering
OMRSD - Operational Maintenance Requirements and Specifications
Document
PBI - Push Button Indicator
PCI - Potential Critical Item
PLT - Pilot
POS - Position
A-I
w
ACRONYMS
RI
RM
RPA
RPTA
RTLS
SCB
SM
SOP
SPA
SPT
SRB
STS
SV
TAL
TD
WONG
WOW
- Rockwell International
- Redundancy Management
- Rudder Pedal Assembly
- Rudder Pedal Transducer Assembly
- Return To Launch Site
- Steering Control Box
- Systems Management
- Subsystem Operating Program
- Steering Position Amplifier
- Steering Position Transducer
- Solid Rocket Booster
- Space Transportation System
- Servo Valve
- Transoceanic Abort Landing
- Touch Down
- Weight on Nose Gear
- Weight on Wheels (main gear)
XDUCER- Transducer
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DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
i
B.I Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 22206. Instructions For Preparation
of FMEA/C_L, i0 October 1986, were used with the following
amplifications and additions.
_NTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
to OPS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
AO___A- begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
AT__OO- begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
planned end of mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE (MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(ops)
MC - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/6bjective accomplishments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,
middeck P/L, etc.)
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MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or event of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOMINAD CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OPS - software operational sequence
PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
_HASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up and ends at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transition out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
ONORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at transition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and ends at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDING/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear
touchdown and ends with the completion of post-landing
safing operations
w
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DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS m
B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, Instructions for
PreDaration of FMEA/CIL, I0 October 1986, was employed with the
following amplifications and additions.
l
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•
.
•
.
The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown.
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawings.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error
are out-of-scope of this task.
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All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser•
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail.
Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed•
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest•
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis.
• Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE-. Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
i0. Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
ii. Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to
ensure consistency throughout IOA project•
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B.3 NWS-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
I.
•
•
•
The GPC (CSS) mode of NWS will be considered the
primary mode of directional control for the Orbiter
Vehicle following NGTD during landing rollout.
RATIONALE: This is the flight rule since the Phase II
upgrade of NWS which has flown on 61-A, 61-C and 51-L.
The GPC (CSS) mode of NWS will be active (HOT) for all
landing sites and all landings: EOM and INTACT ABORTS.
RATIONALE: This is the flight rule since the Phase II
upgrade of NWS which has flown on 61-A, 61-C and 51-L.
The Flight Rules will restrict landing conditions
(weather, landing surface, and crosswinds) such that the
brake energy and rollout margins will fall within their
assigned limits when differential braking is used as
the primary mode of directional control following NGTD
during landing rollout.
RATIONALE: The NWS system is presently fail safe at
best with several single point failure points.
Differential braking must be a capable backup system to
NWS for directional control of the vehicle during
landing rollout until the Phase III upgrade of NWS is
completed.
Differential braking will be considered an unlike,
redundant backup system to NWS for directional control
of the Orbiter Vehicle during landing rollout following
NGTD.
RATIONALE: Differential braking applies differential
forces to the main gear tires in order to steer the
Orbiter but NWS uses an actuator system to turn the
nose wheel and steer the vehicle• Current flight rules
restrict landings to those conditions that allow a safe
rollout using differential braking for directional
control.
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The DIRECT (MANUAL) mode of NWS will be considered a
like, redundant backup system to the GPC (CSS) mode of
NWS for directional control of the Orbiter Vehicle
following NGTD during landing rollout.
RATIONALE: Both systems use MAIN BUS A power, the
rudder pedals, the NWS Control Box, the NWS Actuator,
and the nose wheel for directional control of the
Orbiter Vehicle•
The GPC (AUTO) mode of NWS will not be considered a
redundant system to the GPC (CSS) mode of NWS for
directional control of the Orbiter Vehicle during
landing rollout.
RATIONALE: The GPC (AUTO) mode of NWS requires an
active Microwave Scanning Beam Landing System (MSBLS)
which is not available at all runways/landing sites.
The crew does not train using this control mode.
The crew will respond to the annunciation of the NWS
fail light by manually moving the NWS toggle switch to
the OFF position.
RATIONALE: MOD recommended crew procedures dictate
that the NWS switch be toggled to OFF when the NWS fail
light annunciates; however, the DIRECT mode of NWS may
then be selected if conditions warrant the risk.
For purposes of determining the functional criticality
of an item, the total loss of the NWS Actuator Assembly
shimmy damping capability shall result in the possible
loss of life/vehicle.
RATIONALE: Although the co-rotating nose wheels have a
stabilizing effect; sufficient test data is not
available to determine that the total loss of the nose
wheel shimmy damping capability is not life
threatening.
For purposes of passing Redundancy Screen B, the term
"Readily Detectable" shall be satisfied by the pilot's
ability to see the lack of Orbiter response to NWS
inputs during landing rollout.
RATIONALE: One of the pilot's primary tasks during
landing rollout has been to keep the Orbiter Vehicle on
the runway centerline. A loss of NWS response during
rollout is almost immediately recognizable by the pilot
following a rudder pedal input. Corrective action in
the form of differential braking is immediately
available.
mii
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APPENDIX C
DETAILED ASSESSMENT
This section contains the IOA assessment worksheets generated
during the assessment of this subsystem. The information on
these worksheets facilitates the comparison of the NASA FMEA/CIL
(Pre and Post 51-L) to the IOA detailed analysis worksheets
included in Appendix E. Each of these worksheets identifies the
NASA FMEA being assessed, corresponding MDAC Analysis Worksheet
ID (Appendix E), hardware item, criticality, redundancy screens,
and recommendations. For each failure mode, the highest assessed
hardware and functional criticality is compared and discrepancies
noted as "N" in the compare row under the column where the
discrepancy occurred.
w
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LEGEND FOR IOA ASSESSMENT WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission
Redundancy Screens A, B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
NASA Data :
Baseline
New
= NASA FMEA/CIL
= Baseline with Proposed Post 51-L Changes
CIL Item :
X = Included in CIL
Compare Row :
N = Non compare for that column (deviation)
C-I
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
mm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/24/87
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-O01X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BC-(01)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
NWS
1
DIODE (2) (OPEN CIRCUIT/SHORTS)
A. HOCHSTEIN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
II
m
mm
i
m
i
m
M
mm
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/24/87
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-002X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6Q-2203-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(FAILS OFF)
NWS
2
SWITCH, FLIGHT CONTROLLER POWER TOGGLE (2)
LEAD ANALYST: A. HOCHSTEIN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ix]
[ ]
m
b
w
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i
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/24/87
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-003X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6Q-2203-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ON)
LEAD ANALYST:
NWS
3
SWITCH FLIGHT CONTROLLER POWER TOGGLE (2)
A. HOCHSTEIN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
(FAILS
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/24/87
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-004X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BC-(02)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NWS
4
RESISTOR, ISOLATION (HIGH RESISTANCE)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A. NASA SEPARATED THE THREE ISOLATION RESISTORS. THE F_lqL LIGHT
AND GPC MODE RESISTORS WERE LEFT IN 2252-1 AND THE CRITICALITY
LEFT AT 3/3. IOA AGREES WITH THE 3/3 FOR THESE TWO. (SEE IOA
NWS-505).
B. NASA IS WRITING A NEW FMEA, 05-6BC-(02) FOR THE DIRECT MODE
ISOLATION RESISTOR AND ASSIGNING IT A 3/IR CRITICALITY WITH
SCREENS A, B, AND C: PASS, FAIL, PASS RESPECTIVELY. IOA AGREES
WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITY. THE SCREEN B ISSUE IS THE RESULT OF
DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-5
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/22/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
NWS-005X
05-6BC-2109-3
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEw [ X ]
NWS
5
SWITCH, NWS TOGGLE (3 POSITION)
A.S. MEDIAVILLA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C I ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/86
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-101
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-044-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM".
NWS
i01
PEDALS, RUDDER (JAMMED)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
w
m
m
=
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
A. CIL EFFECTS:
"(A,B)...IF YAW LOCKUP OCCURRED DURING NWS, IT COULD BE
COMPENSATED FOR BY DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING, SINCE FAILURE WOULD
OCCUR AT OR NEAR NEUTRAL."
B. THE WORST CASE FAILURE OF THE RUDDER PEDALS DOES NOT OCCUR AT
THE NEUTRAL POSITION. LOCKUP AT A HARDOVER POSITION IS THE WORST
CASE FAILURE AND SHOULD BE CONSIDERED SUCH AS DEFINED IN NSTS
22206.
C. IOA RECOMMENDS REVISING THE LAST SENTENCE UNDER EFFECTS TO
READ: "IF YAW LOCKUP OCCURED DURING NOSE WHEEL STEERING,
DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING MAY NOT BE CAPABLE OF COMPENSATING AND THE
RESULT MAY BE THE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/17/87
ASSESSMENTID: NWS-102
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC3442-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM".
NWS
102
PEDALS, RUDDER(LOSS OF LINKAGE)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
Ix]
[ ]
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA REEVALUATION OF RUDDER PEDALS-RPTA
LINKAGE FAILURE. LOSS OF RUDDER CONTROL BETWEEN MGTD AND NGTD
CAN RESULT IN THE POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
=_
mm
B
m
m
I
l
ms
i
m
mm
mm
m
mm
c_
m
mm
I
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-8 l
B
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
n
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-103
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-086-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NWS
103
TRANSDUCER, COMMAND (NO OUTPUT)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A. THE SCREEN B ISSUE IS THE RESULT OF DIFFERENCES IN GROUND
RULES.
B. IOA RECOMMENDS NO UPDATES.
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m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-104
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-086-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
......B_SELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NWS
104
TRANSDUCER, COMMAND (ERRONEOUS OUTPUT)
A.S. MEDIAVILLA
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A. THE SCREEN B ISSUE IS THE RESULT OF DIFFERENCES IN GROUND
RULES.
B. IOA RECOMMENDS NO UPDATES.
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u
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/17/86
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-105
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC-3442-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 105
ITEM: TRANSDUCER, RUDDER PEDAL ASSEMBLY (RPTA) (SINGLE
CHANNEL NO OUTPUT)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
w
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m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-I06
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC-3442-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: NWS ....
MDAC ID: 106
ITEM: TRANSDUCER, RUDDER PEDAL ASSEMBLY (RPTA)
C_NEL ERRONEOUS_OUTP_--_-) -......
(SINGLE
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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m
z :
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/86
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-107
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC3442-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OF RPTA OUTPUT)
NWS
107
TRANSDUCER, RUDDER PEDAL ASSEMBLY (RPTA)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
(LOSS
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
A. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA REEVALUATION.
[x]
[ ]
B. NWS 107, NWS 108 BOTH MAPPED TO FMEA 05-I-FC-3442-3.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-13
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mm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-108
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC3442-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 108
ITEM: TRANSDUCER, RUDDER PEDAL ASSEMBLY (RPTA)
(ERRONEOUS OUTPUT OF RPTA)
LEAD ANALYST : A. S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
NASA
IOA
COMPARE
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N/N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
A. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA REEVALUATION.
[x]
[ ]
B. NWS 107, NWS 108 BOTH MAPPED TO FMEA 05-I-FC-3442-3.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-201
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-089-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(FAILS ON)
LEAD ANALYST:
NWS
201
BOX, NWS CONTROL - FAILURE DETECTION CIRCUITRY
A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A. THE SCREEN B ISSUE IS THE RESULT OF DIFFERENCES IN GROUND
RULES.
B. IOA RECOMMENDS NO UPDATES.
w
--=
m
J
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-15
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-202
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-089-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(FAILS OFF)
LEAD ANALYST:
SWS -
202
BOX, NWS CONTROL - FAILURE DETECTION CIRCUITRY
A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IN] CN] IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
A. IOA CONCURS WITH FMEA.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
IX]
[ ]
B. IOA RECOMMENDS NO UPDATES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/86
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-203
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 203
ITEM: BOX, STEERING CONTROL - PILOT VALVE CONTROL
CIRCUIT (FAILS SHORT)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ NA]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[313 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
A. NO FMEA WRITTEN.
[ ]
[ ]
B. THE NWS CONTROL BOX MANIPULATES 3 MAJOR NWS SIGNALS: I) THE
PILOT VALVE ACTIVATION SIGNAL (NWS ACTUATOR HYDRAULIC
ACTIVATION), 2) NWS COMMAND SIGNAL, AND 3) THE NWS FAILURE
DETECTION SIGNAL. NASA FMEAs ADDRESS THE NWS CONTROL BOX COMMAND
SIGNAL FAILURES AND THE FAILURE DETECTION CIRCUIT FAILURES BUT
NOT THE PILOT VALVE ACTIVATION SIGNAL FAILURES.
IOA ANALYSIS INCLUDED TWO FAILURE MODES ON THE PILOT VALVE
ACTIVATION SIGNALS. NEITHER OF THESE FAILURES WOULD RAISE THE
EXISTING CRITICALITY OF THE SCB [2/IR].
C. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS FAILURE MODE BE ADDED.
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mp
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/86
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-204
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 204
ITEM: BOX, STEERING CONTROL - PILOT VALVE CONTROL
CIRCUIT (FAILS TO PROVIDE A GROUND)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[p] [P]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[p]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
•(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
A. NO FMEA WRITTEN.
[ ]
[ ]
B. THE NWS CONTROL BOX MANIPULATES 3 MAJOR NWS SIGNALS: I) THE
PILOT VALVE ACTIVATION SIGNAL (NWS ACTUATOR HYDRAULIC
ACTIVATION), 2) NWS COMMAND SIGNAL, AND 3) THE NWS FAILURE
DETECTION SIGNAL. NASA FMEAs ADDRESS THE NWS CONTROL BOX COMMAND
SIGNAL FAILURES AND THE FAILURE DETECTION CIRCUIT FAILURES BUT
NOT THE PILOT VALVE ACTIVATION SIGNAL FAILURES.
IOA ANALYSIS INCLUDED TWO FAILURE MODES ON THE PILOT VALVE
ACTIVATION SIGNALS. NEITHER OF THESE FAILURES WOULD RAISE THE
EXISTING CRITICALITY OF THE SCB [2/iR].
C. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS FAILURE MODE BE ADDED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-205
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-088-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(LOSS OF OUTPUT)
NWS
205
BOX, STEERING CONTROL - STEERING SIGNAL OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
NASA
IOA
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
[x]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A. THE SCREEN B ISSUE IS THE RESULT OF DIFFERENCES IN GROUND
RULES.
B. IOA RECOMMENDS NO UPDATES.
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ms
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/86
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-206
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-088-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(ERRONEOUS OUTPUT)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NWS
206
BOX, STEERING CONTROL - STEERING SIGNAL OUTPUT
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) .....
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
RE_KS:
A. THE SCREEN B ISSUE IS THE RESULT OF DIFFERENCES IN GROUND
RULES.
B. IOA RECOMMENDS NO UPDATES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
NWS-301 BASELINE [ ]
02-1-094-2 NEW [ X ]
NWS
301
ACCUMULATOR/COMPENSATOR (FAILS OPEN)
A.S. MEDIAVILLA
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
w
w
i--
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A. THE SCREEN A ISSUE IS THE RESULT OF DIFFERENCES IN GROUND
RULES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/86
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-302
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-094-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NWS
302
ACCUMULATOR/COMPENSATOR (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
IX]
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /!R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A. THE SCREEN B ISSUE IS THE RESULT OF DIFFERENCES IN GROUND
RULES.
B. IOA RECOMMENDS NO UPDATES.
mm
m
i
mm
i
mm
m
mm
I
l
m
mm
m
mm
z
B
z
[]
!
m
mm
a
mm
l
m
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-22 m
mm
mm
mL
m
u
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-303
NASA FMEA #: 02-I-SPA-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OUTPUT ON ONE CHANNEL)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NWS
303
AMPLIFIER, STEERING POSITION (SPA)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
(ERRONEOUS
A B C
[p] [P] [P]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IN] IN] IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
A. IOA CONCURS WITH FMEA.
C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
C ]
B. IOA RECOMMENDS NO UPDATES.
w
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mm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-304
NASA FMEA #: 02-I-SPA-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 304
ITEM: AMPLIFIER, STEERING POSITION (SPA) (LOSS OF
OUTPUT ON ONE CHANNEL)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS :
A. IOA CONCURS WITH FMEA.
B. IOA RECOMMENDS NO UPDATES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/86
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-305
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OUTPUT)
NWS
305
AMPLIFIER, STEERING POSITION (SPA)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
(ERRONEOUS
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:- (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
A. NO FMEA WRITTEN.
[ ]
[ ]
B. ERRONEOUS OUTPUT OF THE WHOLE SPA MAY BE NON-CREDIBLE. THE
SEPARATE CHANNELS ARE INDIVIDUALLY ENCASED IN PLASTIC PREVENTING
CHANNEL TO CHANNEL SHORTS. A JAMMED STREERING POSITION
TRANSDUCER DRIVE MAY RESULT IN ERRONEOUS/LOSS OUTPUT OF THE SPA
BUT SHOULD BE ADDRESSED AS A FAILURE OF THE SPT.
C. IOA RECOMMENDS NO UPDATE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/86
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-306
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM'.
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PARTIAL OUTPUT)
306
AMPLIFIER, STEERING POSITION (SPA) (LOSS OF OR
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT_
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[p]
[N]
(If different from NASA)
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
A. NO FMEA WRITTEN.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
B. ERRONEOUS OUTPUT OF THE WHOLE SPA MAY BE NON-CREDIBLE. THE
SEPARATE CHANNELS AREINDIVIDUALL¥ ENCASED IN PLASTIC PREVENTING
CHANNEL TO CHANNEL SHORTS. A JAMMED STREERING POSITION
TRANSDUCER DRIVE MAY RESULT IN ERRONEOUS/LOSS OUTPUT OF THE SPA
BUT SHOULD BE ADDRESSED AS A FAILURE OF THE SPT.
C. IOA RECOMMENDS NO UPDATE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/86
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-307
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-090-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 307
ITEM: ASSEMBLY, ACTUATOR - HYDRAULIC HOUSING
(RUPTURE/LEAKAGE)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-27
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
mm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/86
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-308
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NWS
308
PISTON, ACTUATOR ARM (JAMMED)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
(If different from NASA)
[1/1 ] C ] [ ] [ ] CA]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A. NO FMEA WRITTEN.
B. A JAMMED ACTUATOR ARM CAN OCCUR AS THE RESULT OF DEBRIS
EXTERNAL TO THE ORBITER BECOMING LODGED BETWEEN THE PISTON AND
THE NOSE WHEEL STEERING COLUMN.
C. A JAMMED ACTUATOR ARM WILL RESULT IN THE ORBITER POSSIBLY
LEAVING THE RUNWAY AND THE POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
D. IOA RECOMMENDS A FMEA BE WRITTEN FOR THIS ITEM REGARDLESS OF
THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURENCE DUE TO THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE
FAILURE MODE.
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m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
NWS-309 BASELINE [ ]
02-1-084-1 NEW [ X ]
NWS
309
PISTON, ACTUATOR ARM (BROKEN LINKAGE)
A.S. MEDIAVILLA
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
u
wm_
I
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
:-=
in--
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u
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/03/86
ASSESSMENTID: NWS-310
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
NWS
310
FILTER, INLET (SHUTOFFVALVE) (FAILS TO FILTER)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCYSCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
[ ] C ] [ ]
[ P ] C F ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
m
I
l
I
mm
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mm
RECOMMENDATIONS :
[ 2 /IR ]
(If different from NASA)
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
A. NO FMEA WRITTEN.
[ ]
[ ]
B. FAILURE TO FILTER WILL RESULT IN THE CONTAMINATION OF THE NWS
ACTUATOR VALVE AND THE LOSS OF NWS.
C. A FAILURE REPORT (FPR A4640-01) HAS ALREADY BEEN WRITTEN FOR
THIS FAILURE MODE.
D. IOA RECOMMENDS NASA WRITE A FMEA FOR THIS FAILURE MODE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/86
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-311
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NWS
311
FILTER, INLET (SHUTOFF VALVE) (BLOCKED)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA
IOA
[ / ] [ ]
[ 2/IR] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [P] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
A. NO FMEA WRITTEN.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
B. CONTAMINATION OF THE FILTER WILL RESTRICT THE HYDRAULIC FLOW
TO THE ACTUATOR RESULTING IN THE LOSS OF NWS.
C. A FAILURE REPORT (FPR A4640-01) FOR THE FILTER DISCUSSES THE
FAILURE OF THE ACTUATOR TO MEET THE STEERING RATE REQUIREMENT AS
A RESULT OF CONTAMINATION TO THE FILTER.
D. IOA RECOMMENDS NASA WRITE A FMEA FOR THIS FAILURE MODE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/86
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-312
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(RUPTURE/LEAKAGE)
NWS
312
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM - CONNECTORS, HOSE ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
A. NO FMEA WRITTEN.
(if applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
B. THERE IS A NON-FLEXIBLE HYDRAULIC LINE LEADING FROM THE
RETRACTION SIDE OF THE ACTUATOR PISTON TO THE ACTUATOR MAIN
HOUSING. LEAKAGE FROM THIS LINE OR ITS CONNECTORS COULD CAUSE
THE TOTAL LOSS OF NWS AND THE SHIMMY DAMPING CAPABILITY OF THE
ACTUATOR. THE SUBSEQUENT SHINY OF THE NOSE WHEEL WOULD RESULT
IN THE POSSIBLE FAILURE OF THE NOSE GEAR AND LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
NO TEST DATA ON THE EFFECTS OF SHIMMY WITH NO HYDRAULIC DAMPING
IS AVAILABLE. THE FACT THAT THE COROTATING NOSE WHEELS HAVE SOME
STABILIZING EFFECT IS NOT ENOUGH TO DISMISS THE SHIMMY ISSUE.
C. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT NASA WRITE A FMEA FOR THIS FAILURE MODE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/86
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-313
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 313
ITEM: HYDRAULIC SYSTEM - CONNECTORS, HOSE ASSEMBLY
(FAILS CLOSED-BLOCKED)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
A. NO FMEA WRITTEN.
C ]
C ]
B. HIGHLY PRESSURIZED HYDRAULIC LINES FAILING BLOCKED MAY BE
CONSIDERED A NON-CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE.
C. IOA RECOMMENDS NO UPDATE.
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m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/86
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-314
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-093-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NWS
314
SWITCH, PRESSURE (FAILS OPEN)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[p] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
A. NWS SUBSYSTEM GROUND RULE #7: "THE CREW WILL MANUALLY RESPOND
TO THE ANNUNCIATION OF THE NWS FAIL LIGHT BY MANUALLY MOVING THE
NWS TOGGLE SWITCH TO THE OFF POSITION".
B. IOA EFFECTS: WORST CASE, LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE WITH 2 FAILURES,
I) LOSS OF NWS CAPABILITY (FAIL LIGHT ON RESULTING IN DOWNMODING
TO FREE CASTOR, SEE NWS GROUNDRULE NO. 7), 2) LOSS OF
DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING CAPABILITY. CRITICALITY IS DEPENDENT UPON
PROCEDURES FOR NWS FAIL LIGHT 'ON'.
C. CREW IS BEING TRAINED NOT TO MANUALLY DOWNMODE NWS IN RESPONSE
TO THE ANNUNICATION OF THE NWS FAIL LIGHT. AS A RESULT, IOA WILL
REMOVE ITS RECOMMENDATION FOR A CRITICALITY UPGRADE.
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w
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/86
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-315
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-093-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NWS
315
SWITCH, PRESSURE (CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
i
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-316
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-087-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NWS
316
TRANSDUCER, FEEDBACK (NO OUTPUT)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] _ [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A. THE SCREEN B ISSUE IS THE RESULT OF DIFFERENCES IN GROUND
RULES.
B. IOA RECOMMENDS NO UPDATES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-317
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-087-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NWS
317
TRANSDUCER, FEEDBACK (ERRONEOUS OUTPUT)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A. THE SCREEN B ISSUE IS THE RESULT OF DIFFERENCES IN GROUND
RULES.
B. IOA RECOMMENDS NO UPDATES.
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-318
NASA FMEA #: 02-I-SPT-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CHANNEL NO OUTPUT)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ASSESSMENT:
NWS
318
TRANSDUCER, STEERING POSITION (SPT) (SINGLE
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ F ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
REcoMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(if different from NASA)
] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS: ....
A. IOA CONCURS WITH FMEA.
[x]
[ ]
B. IOA RECOMMENDS NO UPDATES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-319
NASA FMEA #: 02-I-SPT-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 319
ITEM: TRANSDUCER, STEERING POSITION (SPT) (SINGLE
CHANNEL ERRONEOUS OUTPUT)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
NASA
IOA
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ]
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
A. IOA CONCURS WITH FMEA.
ix]
[ ]
B. IOA RECOMMENDS NO UPDATES.
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mm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-320
NASA FMEA #: 02-I-SPT-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM".
OUTPUT)
NWS
320
TRANSDUCER, STEERING POSITION (SPT) (LOSS OF SPT
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[p] [P]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
C ]
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
A. BOTH NWS-320 AND NWS-321 MAPPED TO FMEA #02-I-SPT-3.
ix]
]
B. IOA RECOMMENDS NO UPDATE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-321
NASA FMEA #: 02-I-SPT-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 321
ITEM: TRANSDUCER, STEERING POSITION (SPT) (ERRONEOUS
OUTPUT OF THE SPT)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B c
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A. BOTH NWS-320 AND NWS-321 MAPPED TO FMEA #02-I-SPT-3.
B. IOA RECOMMENDS NO UPDATE.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/03/86
ASSESSMENTID: NWS-322
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-091-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
OPEN/LEAKAGE)
LEAD ANALYST:
NWS
322
VALVE, ANTI-CAVITATION CHECK (FAILS
A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[x]
[ ]
RECO_NDATIONS: .(If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
A. IOA RECOMMENDS NO UPDATES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
NWS-323 BASELINE [ ]
02-1-091-1 NEW [ X ]
NWS
323
VALVE, ANTI-CAVITATION CHECK (FAILS CLOSED)
A.S. MEDIAVILLA
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ 3 /1R ]
(If different from NASA)
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
A. CIL EFFECTS: "(B) LOSS OF NWS (LOSS OF TORQUE) .... "
B. FAILING THE CHECK VALVES CLOSED DOES NOT RESULT IN THE LOSS OF
NWS TORQUE.
C. IOA RECOMMENDS A CRITICALITY OF 3/IR. FAILURE OF BOTH ANTI-
CAVITATION CHECK VALVES IS NOT LIFE/VEHICLE THREATENING. BUT THE
FAILURE OF BOTH VALVES AND THEN A NWS FAILURE THAT FORCES THE
FREE CASTOR MODE COULD RESULT IN CAVITATION. THE IOA ANALYSIS
ORIGINALLY DID NOT CONSIDER CAVITATION LIFE/VEHICLE THREATENING
BUT A CONSERVATIVE APPROACH WOULD BE TO ASSIGN THE FAILURE MODE A
3/1R.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/86
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-324
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-092-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NWS
324
VALVE, E-H SERVO (FAILS TO RESPOND)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
I
i
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ms
m
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A. THE SCREEN B ISSUE IS THE RESULT OF DIFFERENCES IN GROUND
RULES.
B. IOA RECOMMENDS NO UPDATES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/86
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-325
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-092-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NWS
325
VALVE, E-H SERVO (ERRATIC RESPONSE)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A. THE SCREEN B ISSUE IS THE RESULT OF DIFFERENCES IN GROUND
RULES.
B. IOA RECOMMENDS NO UPDATES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/86
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-326
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-101-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ISOLATION)
NWS
326
VALVE, E-H PROTECTION CHECK (RETURN LINE
(FAILS OPEN)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
A. IF THE VALVE FAILS OPEN JUST PRIOR TO LANDING GEAR (LG)
RETRACTION, HIGH PRESSURE BUILDUP DURING RETRACTION COULD DAMAGE
THE SERVO VALVE FIRST STAGE. MUCH LATER, DURING THE ACTUAL
FLIGHT WHEN NWS IS ACTIVATED, THE DAMAGED E-H SERVO VALVE COULD
RESULT IN A DOWNMODE TO FREE CASTOR. THE OPEN CHECK VALVE ALSO
RESULTS IN THE DEGRADATION OF SHIMMY DAMPING PROTECTION.
B. IOA RECOMMENDS AN UPGRADE IN CRITICALITY TO 2/IR.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/86
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-327
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-101-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ISOLATION)
NWS
327
VALVE, E-H PROTECTION CHECK (RETURN LINE
(FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A. THE SCREEN B ISSUE IS THE RESULT OF DIFFERENCES IN GROUND
RULES.
B. IOA RECOMMENDS NO UPDATES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/86
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-328
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-106-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NWS
328
VALVE, OVERLOAD CHECK (2 OF) (FAILS OPEN)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
A. CIL EFFECTS: "(B)...CHECK VALVE FAILING OPEN AGAINST SYSTEM
PRESSURE IS NOT CREDIBLE."
B. CONTAMINATION OF THE VALVE CAN PREVENT THE BALL IN THE VALVE
FROM SEATING AND CAUSE LEAKAGE.
C. THE SCREEN B ISSUE IS THE RESULT OF DIFFERENCES IN GROUND
RULES.
D. IOA RECOMMENDS REVISING THE EFFECTS/RATIONALE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/86
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-329
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-106-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NWS
329
VALVE, OVERLOAD CHECK (2 OF) (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT".
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
IF] IF] [P]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] EN] [ ]
[ ] *
[X]
[N]
m
imm
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/IR] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A. THE IOA EFFECTS ASSUME THE WORST CASE: A FAILED-CLOSED VALVE
AND THEN THE NOSE WHEEL HITTING A RUT OR FOREIGN OBJECT CAUSING
AN UNRELIEVED HIGH PRESSURE SPIKE THAT DAMAGES THE FIRST STAGE OF
THE EH VALVE RESULTING IN THE LOSS OF NWS.
B. IOA RECOMMENDS AN UPGRADE IN CRITICALITY TO 2/IR.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/86
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-330
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-095-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NWS
330
VALVE, PILOT SOLENOID I (FAILS OPEN)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A. NASA COMBINED PILOT SOLENOID VALVES 1 AND 2 FOR FAILURE MODE
_kiYSIS. I0A AGREE-S WIT_ THE 3/3 cRITICALITIEs FOR PILOT
SOLENOID VALVES 1 AND 2 "FAIL OPEN".
B. IOA RECOMMENDS THE WRITING OF SEPARATE FMEA/CILs FOR THE TWO
PILOT SOLENOID VALVES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/86
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-331
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-095-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NWS
331
VALVE, PILOT SOLENOID 1 (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A. NASA COMBINED PILOT SOLENOID VALVES 1 AND 2 FOR FAILURE MODE
ANALYSIS. IOA AGREES WITH THE 2/IR CRITICALITIES GIVEN EACH
VALVE FOR THE "FAIL CLOSED" MODE.
B. THE SCREEN B ISSUE IS THE RESULT OF DIFFERENCES IN GROUND
RULES.
C. IOA RECOMMENDS THE WRITING OF SEPARATE FMEA/CILs FOR THE TWO
PILOT SOLENOID VALVES.
W
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l
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/86
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-332
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-095-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NWS
332
VALVE, PILOT SOLENOID 2 (FAILS OPEN)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
A. NASA COMBINED PILOT SOLENOID VALVES 1 AND 2 FOR FAILURE MODE
ANALYSIS. IOA AGREES WITH THE 3/3 CRITICALITIES FOR PILOT
SOLENOID VALVES 1 AND 2 "FAIL OPEN".
B. IOA RECOMMENDS THE WRITING OF SEPARATE FMEA/CILs FOR THE TWO
PILOT SOLENOID VALVES.
M
m
l
g
m
rE
U
m
m
I
g
m
m
m
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-52
I
I
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
L
L
u
L
w
w
w
w
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/86
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-333
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-095-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NWS
333
VALVE, PILOT SOLENOID 2 (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A. NASA COMBINED PILOT SOLENOID VALVES 1 AND 2 FOR FAILURE MODE
ANALYSIS. IOA AGREES WITH THE 2/IR CRITICALITIES GIVEN EACH
VALVE FOR THE "FAIL CLOSED" MODE.
B. THE SCREEN B ISSUE IS THE RESULT OF DIFFERENCES IN GROUND
RULES.
C. IOA RECOMMENDS THE WRITING OF SEPARATE FMEA/CILs FOR THE TWO
PILOT SOLENOID VALVES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/86
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-334
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-100-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NWS
334
VALVE, RELIEF/CONTROL/BYPASS (FAILS OPEN)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IN] IN] IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ x] *
[ ]
[ N ]
D
g
u
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
A. IOA RECOMMENDS NO UPDATES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
B. IOA RECOMMENDS THIS FMEA/CIL BE RECONSIDERED UNDER THE SHIMMY
DAMPING ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/86
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-335
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-100-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NWS
335
VALVE, RELIEF/CONTROL/BYPASS (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
L
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A. THE SCREEN B ISSUE IS THE RESULT OF DIFFERENCES IN GROUND
RULES.
B. IOA RECOMMENDS NO UPDATES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/86
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-336
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-096-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NWS
336
VALVE, SHUTOFF (FAILS OPEN)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[N] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
• (ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A. THE EFFECTS OF I) FAILING THE SHUTOFF VALVE 'OPEN' AND 2)
FAILING PILOT VALVE #i 'OPEN' ARE IDENTICAL; HOWEVER, THE NASA
FMEAS ASSIGN THE FAILURE MODES DIFFERENT CRITICALITIES.
B. IOA RECOMMENDS DOWNGRADING THIS ITEM'S CRITICALITY UNLESS THE
FAILURE OF ALL LIKE/UNLIKE REDUNDANCY CAN BE SHOWN TO BE LIFE
THREATENING.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NWS-337
02-1-096-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NWS
337
VALVE, SHUTOFF (FAILS CLOSED)
A.S. MEDIAVILLA
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A. THE SCREEN B ISSUE IS THE RESULT OF DIFFERENCES IN GROUND
RULES.
B. IOA RECOMMENDS NO UPDATES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-401
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BC-2112-I & 05-3-1234
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NWS
401
LIGHT, NWS FAIL (FAILS OFF)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ....
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. _'!
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/86
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-402
NASA FMEA #: 05-03-12376-TBD
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NWS
402
ASSEMBLY, ANNUNCIATOR CONTROL (PREMATURE ON)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
E
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A. NWS SUBSYSTEM GROUNDRULE #7: "THE CREW WILL MANUALLY RESPOND
TO THE ANNUNCIATION OF THE NWS FAIL LIGHT BY MANUALLY MOVING THE
NWS TOGGLE SWITCH TO THE OFF POSITION".
B. IOA EFFECTS: WORST CASE, LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE WITH 2 FAILURES,
i) LOSS OF NWS CAPABILITY (FAIL LIGHT ON RESULTING IN DOWNMODING
TO FREE CASTOR, SEE NWS GROUNDRULE NO. 7), 2) LOSS OF
DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING CAPABILITY. CRITICALITY IS DEPENDENT UPON
PROCEDURES FOR NWS FAIL LIGHT 'ON'.
C. CREW IS BEING TRAINED NOT MANUALLY DOWNMODE NWS IN RESPONSE TO
THE ANNUNCIATION OF THE NWS FAIL LIGHT. AS A RESULT, IOA WILL
REMOVE ITS RECOMMENDATION FOR A CRITICALITY UPGRADE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/86
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-403
NASA FMEA #: 05-3-012376-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NWS
403
ASSEMBLY, ANNUNCIATOR CONTROL (LOSS OF OUTPUT)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT-.
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
U
ms
i
m
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-404
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BC-2200-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 404
ITEM: ASSEMBLY, FORWARD LOAD CONTROL (TYPE III HYBRID
DRIVER CONTROLLER) (PREMATURE OUTPUT)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A. NWS SUBSYSTEM GROUNDRULE #7: "THE CREW WILL MANUALLY RESPOND
TO THE ANNUNCIATION OF THE NWS FAIL LIGHT BY MANUALLY MOVING THE
NWS TOGGLE SWITCH TO THE OFF POSITION".
B. IOA EFFECTS: WORST CASE, LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE WITH 2 FAILURES,
i) LOSS OF NWS CAPABILITY (FAIL LIGHT ON RESULTING IN DOWNMODING
TO FREE CASTOR, SEE NWS GROUNDRULE NO. 7), 2) LOSS OF
DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING CAPABILITY. CRITICALITY IS DEPENDENT UPON
PROCEDURES FOR NWS FAIL LIGHT 'ON'.
C. CREW IS BEING TRAINED NOT TO MANUALLY DOWNMODE NWS IN RESPONSE
TO THE ANNUNCIATION OF THE NWS FAIL LIGHT. AS A RESULT, IOA WILL
REMOVE ITS RECOMMENDATION FOR A CRITICALITY UPGRADE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-405
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BC-2200-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 405
ITEM: ASSEMBLY, FORWARD LOAD CONTROL (TYPE III HYBRID
DRIVER CONTROLLER) (LOSS OF OUTPUT)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS-.
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/17/87
ASSESSMENTID: NWS-501
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BC-2245-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM'.
NWS
501
CIRCUIT BREAKER (CB 023) (FAILS OPEN)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
n
w
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
IX]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-502
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BC-2245-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NWS
502
CIRCUIT BREAKER (CB 023) (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[
[
[
] *
]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
• - - (ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-503
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7248-0001
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(JAMMED IN AUTO)
NWS
503
INDICATOR, PUSH BUTTON: ROLL/YAW (CSS/AUTO)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA'S REVISED "WORK AROUND" IS STILL CONSIDERED BY IOA AS OFF
NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES WHICH CANNOT BE USED TO DOWNGRADE
CRITICALITY (PER 22206).
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-504
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7248-0001 & 05-I-F
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 504
ITEM: INDICATOR, PUSH BUTTON: ROLL/YAW (CSS/AUTO)
(FAILS TO RESPOND)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT".
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A. THE NASA EFFECTS DON'T ADDRESS THE LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
(LIKE AND/OR UNLIKE) TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION.
B. IOA RECOMMENDS UPGRADING THE CRITICALITY TO 3/IR.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/24/87
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-505
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BC-2252-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NWS
505
RESISTORS, ISOLATION (3)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A. NASA SEPARATED THE THREE ISOLATION RESISTORS. THE FAIL LIGHT
AND GPC MODE RESISTORS WERE LEFT IN 2252-1 AND THE CRITICALITY
LEFT AT 3/3. IOA AGREES WITH THE 3/3 FOR THESE TWO.
B. NASA IS WRITING A NEW FMEA, 05-6BC-(02) FOR THE DIRECT MODE
ISOLATION RESISTOR AND ASSIGNING IT A 3/IR CRITICALITY WITH
SCREENS A, B, AND C: PASS, FAIL, PASS RESPSECTIVELY
IOA AGREES WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITY (SEE IOA NWS-9). THE
SCREEN B ISSUE IS THE RESULT OF DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-506
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BC-2252-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NWS
506
RESISTORS, ISOLATION (3) (LOW RESISTANCE)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A. FMEA #05-6BC-2252-I LISTS FAILURE MgDES FOR THE ISOLATION
RESISTORS AS FOLLOWS: ALL CREDIBLE MODES, ELEMENT OPENS, HiGH
RESISTANCE.
B. IOA RECOMMENDS NO UPDATES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NWS-507
05-6BC-2251-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NWS
507
RESISTOR, CURRENT LIMIT (HIGH RESISTANCE)
A.S. MEDIAVILLA
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
BOTH NWS 507 AND NWS 508 ARE MAPPED TO FMEA #05-6BC-2251-I WHICH
LIST FAILURE MODES FOR CURRENT LIMIT RESISTOR AS FOLLOWS: ALL
CREDIBLE MODES, ELEMENT OPENS, HIGH RESISTANCE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-508
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BC-2251-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NWS
508
RESISTOR, CURRENT LIMIT (LOW RESISTANCE)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
BOTH NWS 507 _D _S 508 ARE MAPPED TO FMEA #05-6BC-2251-I WHICH
LIST FAILURE MODES FOR CURRENT LIM_TRESISTOR AS FOLLOWS: ALL
CREDIBLE MODES, ELEMENT OPENS, HIGH RESISTANCE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-509
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BC-2109-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 509
ITEM: SWITCH, NWS TOGGLE (3 POSITION)
CONTACT:GPC POSITION)
(FAILS TO ACTIVE
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THE GPC MODE OF NWS IS THE PRIMARY MODE OF DIRECTIONAL CONTROL
FOR THE ORBITER DURING LANDING ROLL OUT AND THE NWS TOGGLE SWITCH
IS SET TO THE 'GPC' POSITION BEFORE MGTD. FAILURE OF THE NWS
TOGGLE SWITCH TO THE 'GPC' POSITION HAS NO EFFECT BEYOND
THE LOSS OF THE CAPABILITY TO MANUALLY DESELECT THE GPC MODE OF
NWS.
ANY FAILURE OF THE NWS SYSTEM COULD STILL LEAD TO NWS BEING
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNMODED TO FREE CASTOR AND THE ANNUNCIATION OF
THE NWS FAIL LIGHT.
FMEA EFFECTS DO NOT ADEQUATELY SUBSTANTIATE CRITICALITY.
I
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/17/87
ASSESSMENTID: NWS-510
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BC-2109-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
NWS
510
SWITCH, NWS TOGGLE (3 POSITION) (FAILS OFF)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
m
m
m
l
m
B
m
mm
l
m
l
I
I
m
D
I
m
g
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-72
B
m
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
z
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/86
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-601
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 601
ITEM: MDM FFI
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
_I
U
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A. IOA HAS DECIDED TO DELETE THE MDM FAILURE MODE ANALYSIS FROM
THE NWS ASSESSMENT. ALL OF THE MDM ANALYSIS IS COVERED IN THE
DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM (DPS) ASSESSMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/86
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-602
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 602
ITEM: MDM FFI
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A. IOA HAS DECIDED TO DELETE THE MDM FAILURE MODE ANALYSIS FROM
THE NWS ASSESSMENT. ALL OF THE MDM ANALYSIS IS COVERED IN THE
DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM (DPS) ASSESSMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/86
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-603
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 603
ITEM: MDM FFI
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
r _
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A. IOA HAS DECIDED TO DELETE THE MDM FAILURE MODE ANALYSIS FROM
THE NWS ASSESSMENT. ALL OF THE MDM ANALYSIS IS COVERED IN THE
DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM (DPS) ASSESSMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/86
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-604
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 604
ITEM: MDM FF2
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A. IOA HAS DECIDED TO DELETE THE MDM FAILURE MODE ANALYSIS FROM
THE NWS ASSESSMENT. ALL OF THE MDM ANALYSIS IS COVERED IN THE
DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM (DPS) ASSESSMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/86
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-605
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 605
ITEM: MDM FF2
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A. IOA HAS DECIDED TO DELETE THE MDM FAILURE MODE ANALYSIS FROM
THE NWS ASSESSMENT. ALL OF THE MDM ANALYSIS IS COVERED IN THE
DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM (DPS) ASSESSMENT.
=
w
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-77
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/03/86
ASSESSMENTID: NWS-606
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 606
ITEM: MDM FF2
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)_
• ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A. IOA mS DECIDED TO DELETE THE MDM FAILURE MODE ANALYSIS FRQM
DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM (DPS) ASSESSMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/86
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-607
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 607
ITEM: MDM FF3
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A. IOA HAS DECIDED TO DELETE THE MDM FAILURE MODE ANALYSIS FROM
THE NWS ASSESSMENT. ALL OF THE MDM ANALYSIS IS COVERED IN THE
DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM (DPS) ASSESSMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/86
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-608
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 608
ITEM: MDM FF3
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
..... ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A. IOA HAS DECIDED TO DELETE THE MDM FAILURE MODE ANALYSIS FROM
T_E _m_sls_S_. _A_F _T_E_M_M_I_ i_ _C_V_R_B__ TH_
DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM (DPS) ASSESSMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/86
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-609
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 609
ITEM: MDM FF3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
A.S. MEDIAVILLA
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
i
w
=
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A. IOA HAS DECIDED TO DELETE THE MDM FAILURE MODE ANALYSIS FROM
THE NWS ASSESSMENT. ALL OF THE MDM ANALYSIS IS COVERED IN THE
DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM (DPS) ASSESSMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/86
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-610
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 610
ITEM: MDM FF4
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASADATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _< ....
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A IOa HAS DECIDED TO DELETE THE MDM FAILURE MODE ANALYSIS FROM
THE NWS ASSESSMENT. ALL OF THE MDM ANALYSIS IS COVERED IN THE
DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM (DPS) ASSESSMENT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
m
m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/86
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-611
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 611
ITEM: MDM FF4
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] *
[ P ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A. IOA HAS DECIDED TO DELETE THE MDM FAILURE MODE ANALYSIS FROM
THE NWS ASSESSMENT. ALL OF THE MDM ANALYSIS IS COVERED IN THE
DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM (DPS) ASSESSMENT.
w
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
m
m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/86
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-612
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 612
ITEM: MDM FF4
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT".
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A. IOA HAS DECIDED TO DELETE THE MDM FAILURE MODE ANALYSIS FROM
THE NWS ASSESSMENT. ALL OF THE MDM ANALYSIS IS COVERED IN THE
DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM (DPS) ASSESSMENT.
E
m
mm
m
[]
m
mm
mm
[]
m
[]
i
[]
[]
m
M
u
[]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-84
m
m
m
[]
APPENDIX D
CRITICAL ITEMS
i,J
D-I
NASA FMEA
o5-6Q-22o3-I
05-6BC-(02)
05-6BC-2109-3
02-1-044-1
05-I-FC3442-3
02-1-086-1
02-1-086-2
05-I-FC3442-3
05-I-FC3442-3
02-1-089-2
02-1-089-1
02-1-088-1
02-1-088-2
02-1-094-2
02-1-094-1
02-1-090-1
02-1-084-1
02-1-087-1
02-1-087-2
02-I-SPT-I
02-I-SPT-2
02-1-091-2
02-1-091-1
02-1-092-1
02-1-092-2
02-1-101-2
02-1-101-1
02-1-106-2
02-1-106-1
02-1-095-1
02-1-095-1
02-1-100-2
02-1-100-1
02-1-096-1
05-6BC-2245-I
05-I-FC7248-0001
05-6BC-2109-2
05-6BC-2109-I
APPENDIX D
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS
MDAC-ID ITEM
2
4
5
i01
102
103
104
107
108
201
202
204
205
206
301
302
307
308
309
310
311
312
316
317
318
319
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
331
333
334
335
337
501
503
509
510
SWITCH, FLIGHT CONTROL
RESISTOR, ISOLATION
SWITCH, NWS TOGGLE
PEDALS, RUDDER
PEDALS, RUDDER
TRANSDUCER, COMMAND
TRANSDUCER, COMMAND
TRANSDUCER, RUDDER
TRANSDUCER, RUDDER
BOX, NWS CONTROL
BOX, NWS CONTROL
BOX, STEERING CONTROL
BOX, STEERING CONTROL
BOX, STEERING CONTROL
ACCUMULATOR
ACCUMULATOR
ASSEMBLY, ACTUATOR
PISTON, ACTUATOR ARM
PISTON, ACTUATOR ARM
FILTER, INLET
FILTER, INLET
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
TRANSDUCER, FEEDBACK
TRANSDUCER, FEEDBACK
TRANSDUCER, STEERING
TRANSDUCER, STEERING
VALVE, ANTI-CAVITATION
VALVE, ANTI-CAVITATION
VALVE, E-H SERVO
VALVE, E-H SERVO
VALVE, E-H PROTECTION
VALVE, E-H PROTECTION
VALVE, OVERLOAD CHECK
VALVE, OVERLOAD CHECK
VALVE, PILOT SOLENOID
VALVE,_PILOT SOLENOID
VALVE,::RELIEF/CONTROL
VALVE, RELIEF/CONTROL
VALVE, SHUTOFF
CIRCUIT BREAKER
INDICATOR, PUSH BUTTON
SWITCH, NWS TOGGLE
SWITCH, NWS TOGGLE
FAILURE MODE
FAILS CLOSED
HIGH RESISTANCE
FAILS TO DIRECT
JAMMED
LOSS OF LINKAGE
NO OUTPUT
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LOSS OF OUTPUT
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
FAILS ON
FAILS OFF
FAILS OPEN
LOSS OF PARTIAL
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS CLOSED
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE
FAILS JAMMED
FAILS TO RESPOND
FAILS TO FILTER
FAILS CLOSED
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE
NO ouTPUT
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
SINGLE CHANNEL
SINGLE C_EL
FAILS OPEN/LEAKAGE
FAILS CLOSED
FAILS TO RESPOND
ERRATIC RESPONSE
FAILS OPEN
FAILS CLOSED
FAILS OPEN/LEAKAGE
FAILS CLOSED
FAILS CLOSED
FAILS CLOSED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS CLOSED
FAILS CLOSED
FAILS OPEN
JAMS TO ACTIVE
FAILS TO GPC
FAILS OFF
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APPENDIX E
DETAILED ANALYSIS
This appendix contains the IOA analysis worksheets supplementing
previous results reported in STSEOS Working Paper 1.0-WP-VA86001-
03, Analysis of the Nose Wheel Steering, (21 November 1986).
Prior results were obtained independently and documented before
starting the FMEA/CIL assessment activity. Supplemental analysis
was performed to address failure modes not previously considerea
by the IOA. Each sheet identifies the hardware item being
analyzed, parent assembly and function performed. For each
failure mode possible causes are identified, and hardware and
functional criticality for each mission phase are determined as
described in NSTS 22206, _structions for Preparation of FMEA and
CIL, I0 October 1986. Failure mode effects are described at the
bottom of each sheet and worst case criticality is identified at
the top.
LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
w
w
w
w
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle.
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A:
1 = Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 = Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 = Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
NA = Not Applicable
Redundancy Screens B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
E-I
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/24/87
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 1
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE (2) (OPEN CIRCUIT/SHORTS)
OPEN CIRCUIT/SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: A. HOCHSTEIN SUBSYS LEAD: A. HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NWS
FAILURE ANNUNCIATOR ASSEMBLY (EPD&C)
DIODE (2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
/NA
] c [
AREA B3 FORWARD AVIONICS BAY NO. 3A
V070-763430-004
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: .................
THESE DIODES ISOLATE THE NWS FAIL SIGNAL TO THE TYPE III HYBRID
DRIVER CONTROLLER; ONE ON THE HARDWIRED CIRCUIT FROM THE SCB, AND
ONE FROM THE NW POSITION SOP VIA MDM FF4. THIS FAILURE TO ALLOW
THE NWS FAIL SIGNAL TQ__A/___NCIATE T HEFAIL LIGHT RESULTS IN
A LOSS OF EARLY DETECTION OF A NWS FAILURE. CREW RECOGNITION OF
A SECOND NWS FAILURE WOULD BE AFTER THE FACT - RESULTING IN THE
NEED FOR A MORE TIME CRITICAL CORRECTIVE ACTION.
THE DIRECT MODE OF NWS IS STILL AVAILABLE. RUDDER CONTROL OF THE
VEHICLE IS AVAILABLE AT EFFECTIVE SPEEDS. DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING
IS A so-DE 0F STEERING THAT IS STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES:
i.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/24/87
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 2
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
OFF)
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, FLIGHT CONTROLLER POWER TOGGLE (2) (FAILS
FAILS CLOSED IN OFF POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: A. HOCHSTEIN SUBSYS LEAD: A. HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
S)
NWS
ACTIVATION SYSTEM (EPD&C-D&C)
FLIGHT CONTROLLER POWER TOGGLE SWITCH: ON/OFF (2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: D&C PANEL F8
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7352
CAUSES: PIECE PART FAILURE, CONTAIMINATION, VIBRATION,
MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ONLY THE RIGHT (DDU2) SWITCH POWERS THE NWS SPA/SPT. ONLY
VEHICLE STEERING EFFECTS WILL BE ADDRESSED IN THIS ANALYSIS.
FLIGHT CONTROL ANALYSIS HAS COVERED THE OTHER COMPONENTS THIS
SWITCH POWERS-UP. THERE IS NO REDUNDANCY TO POWER UP THE NWS
SPA/SPT. FAILING THE SWITCH IN THE OFF POSITION INHIBITS THE GPC
MODE OF NWS. THE DIRECT MODE OF NWS IS STILL AVAILABLE AFTER
WONG. RUDDER CONTROL OF THE VEHICLE IS AVAILABLE AT EFFECTIVE
SPEEDS BUT FAILING THE LEFT AND RIGHT DDU SWITCHES WOULD
INHIBIT BOTH RHCs AND RPTAs. SO FOR THE PERIOD OF TIME BETWEEN
WOW AND WONG, FAILING BOTH SWITCHES WOULD BE LIFE AND VEHICLE
THREATENING (NO DIRECTIONAL CONTROL). DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING IS A
MODE OF STEERING THAT IS AVAILABLE AFTER WONG.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-3
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/24/87
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 3
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM:
ON)
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH FLIGHT CONTROLLER POWER TOGGLE (2)
FAILS CLOSED IN ON POSITION
(FAILS
LEAD ANALYST: A. HOCHSTEIN SUBSYS LEAD: A. HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NWS
ACTIVATION SYSTEM (EPD&C-D&C)
FLIGHT CONTROLLER POWER TOGGLE SWITCH: ON/OFF (2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
D&C PANEL F8
ME452-0102-Z352
CAUSES:
SHOCK
PIECE PART FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE".
DURING THE LANDING PHASE, THIS SWITCH IS NORMALLY ON AND FAILING
CLOSED IN THE "ON" POSITION WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/24/87
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 4
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/IR
ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, ISOLATION (HIGH RESISTANCE)
HIGH RESISTANCE
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA SUBSYS LEAD: A. HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NWS
ACTIVATION SYSTEM (EPD&C)
ISOLATION RESISTOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ i ]
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
/NA
B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
31V73A2A1-A6R2
RLR070512GR
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECAHNICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ISOLATION RESISTOR PROVIDES NW-MAN-ON STATUS MONITORING
CIRCUIT PROTECTION FROM THE MAIN POWER BUS. IF A GPC FAILURE
OCCURS FIRST, SETTING THE ERROR FLAG TO TRUE, AND THEN WHEN
DIRECT IS SWITCHED TO BUT THE RESISTOR HAS FAILED, THE ERROR FLAG
WILL NOT BE RESET, THUS NWS DIRECT CANNOT BE ACTIVATED.
RUDER CONTROL OF THE VEHICLE IS AVAILABLE AT EFFECTIVE SPEEDS.
DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING IS A MODE OF STEERING THAT IS STILL
AVAILABLE. ..........
REFEREnCE-S: _ 05-6BC-(02) ....... _ •
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-5
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 5
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/ NC
FLIGHT:...... _ 2/IR
ABORT : 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, NWS TOGGLE (3 POSITION)
FAILS TO ACTIVE CONTACT: DIRECT POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA SUBSYS LEAD: A. HOCHSTEIN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
v)
8)
9)
NWS
ACTIVATION SYSTEM (EPD&C) _ _ _
NWS 3 POSITION TOGGLE SWITCH: OFF/GPC/DIRECT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
P_LAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/!R
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 2/iR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: 31V73A21AI-S6; PANEL L2AI
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7373
c[P]
CAUSES:
SHOCK
PIECE PART FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE NwsToG_sWITCH SELECTS THE MODE OF NWS TO BE ACTIVATED.
IF THE SWITCH FAILS TO DIRECT, T_EN THERE EXISTS THE POSSIBILITY
OF THE LO_SSOF_N'WS AT _G_D_ _
IF THE RUDDER PEDALS ARE NOT CENTERED AT NGTD, NWS SIGNALS WILL
BE I_EDIATELY TRANSMITTED VIA TH_ COMMAND T_SDUCER._I_IS ;
SCENARIO COULD LEAD TO A COMMAND/ACTUAL MISCOMPARE AND THE LOSS
OF NWS. CYCLING THE SWITCH MAY DO NO GOOD IF THE SWITCH HAS
FAILED TO DIRECT, HOWEVER, IF BOTH GPC _ _RECT ARE 0N, _S IS
DEFAULTED TO GPC MODE. RUDDER CONTROL OF THE VEHICLE IS
AVAILABLE AT EFFECT SPEEDS. DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING IS A MODE OF
STEERING THAT IS STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 03/97/8S E-6
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APPENDIX F .......
NASA FMEA TO IOA WORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE/RECOMMENDATIONS
This section provides a cross reference between the NASA FMEA and
corresponding IOA analysis worksheet(s) included in Appendix E.
The Appendix F identifies: NASA FMEA Number, IOA Assessment
Number, NASA criticality and redundancy screen data, and IOA
recommendations.
w
w
Appendix F Legend
Code Definition
1 IOA recommends generating a FMEA for the item/failure
mode.
2 IOA recommends generating a CIL for the item/failure
mode.
3 IOA recommends a criticality change.
4 IOA recommends deletion of the CIL.
5 IOA recommends generating separate FMEA/CILs for the
items/failure modes.
6 IOA generated a non-credible failure mode.
7 IOA deleted this failure mode from the NWS analysis.
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